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ARTICLES
ADVISING COMPLIANCE IN
FINANCIAL FIRMS: A NEW MISSION
FOR THE LEGAL ACADEMY
James A. Fanto*
This introduction to the symposium issue provides background on the
subject of compliance in financial firms, whose task is to ensure that a
broker-dealer and its employees comply with applicable laws and
regulations. It explains the tasks of compliance in financial firms and
discusses its origins, particularly in the statutory and regulatory obligation
of supervision that is placed upon financial firms and their managers. It then
looks at the reasons for the growth in importance of compliance in recent
years, as well as the likely continued significance of this firm function. It
particularly emphasizes how the recent financial reform legislation
enhanced the role of compliance and diffused it into previously unregulated
financial firms. It next offers several reasons why legal scholars have not
devoted much attention to financial firm compliance and also discusses why
compliance is attracting more scholarly attention, partly because law
graduates are increasingly entering this field. It concludes by offering a few
thoughts on how the legal academy can help compliance become more
successful in its mission, with a reference to contributions of the professors
made during the symposium and to useful work in managerial studies on
how to build effective compliance programs.
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INTRODUCTION
There were several motivations for our symposium on financial firm
compliance, entitled “The Growth and Importance of Compliance in
Financial Firms: Meaning and Implications.”1 First, since the role of
compliance officers has become important and grown in prestige in
* Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Center for the Study of Business Law &
Regulation, Brooklyn Law School. © 2013 James A. Fanto. All rights reserved.
1. This symposium took place on February 8, 2013, at Brooklyn Law School.
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financial firms, it was interesting and useful to explore the reasons for this
phenomenon in an academic setting. Second, the growth in importance of
compliance has occurred without attracting much attention from legal
scholars. Devoting a symposium to the subject helps partly to remedy this
situation. Third, the symposium was also worthwhile to our students
because they appear to be entering into this field in increasing numbers, for,
in an otherwise gloomy job market, compliance represents a potential area
of job growth. Fourth, alumni of our school have important positions in the
compliance field and one of the purposes of our Center for the Study of
Business Law & Regulation is to connect our students to alumni in business
law practice. Accordingly, a symposium on compliance brought several of
our alumni working in compliance to the school for this purpose.2
For the symposium we invited legal scholars who follow developments
in finance closely and who are knowledgeable about broker-dealers and
investment advisers. To a person, they recognized the importance of the
topic and were happy to participate in the symposium. Moreover, as noted
above, the symposium included practitioners in compliance. The design of
the symposium was to have presentations by professors on compliancerelated issues, with compliance practitioners commenting on their talks,
often to inject a real-world perspective into the discussion. The Articles
presented in this issue represent the fruit of that exchange but only
imperfectly capture the lively debates that occurred during the symposium.3
In this Introduction to the symposium issue, I shall provide background
on the subject of compliance. Part I will explain the nature of compliance in
financial firms and discuss its origins, particularly in the statutory and
regulatory obligation of supervision that is placed upon financial firms and
their managers. Part II will look at the reasons for the growth in importance
of compliance in recent years, as well as the likely continued significance of
this firm function. It will particularly emphasize how the recent financial
reform legislation enhanced the role of compliance. Part III will offer
several reasons why legal scholars have not devoted much attention to
financial firm compliance. This Part will also discuss why compliance is
attracting more scholarly attention, partly because law graduates are
increasingly entering this field. The Article concludes by offering a few
thoughts on how the legal academy can help compliance become more
successful in its mission, with a reference to contributions of the professors
made during the symposium.
2. Commentators at the symposium included Ira Goldberg (class of ‘96), a managing director
of JP Morgan Securities; Jonathan Gottlieb (class of ‘92), a managing director and senior counsel
at RBS Securities; Jane A. Kanter (class of ‘73), a partner at Dechert LLP; and Andrew S.
Margolin (class of ‘90), managing director and associate general counsel of Bank of America
Merrill Lynch.
3. The symposium was a success even though it took place on a Friday when a blizzard rolled
into the New York area!
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I. COMPLIANCE, ITS ORIGINS AND PRESENT STATE
It is first useful to identify the compliance function in a firm.4 To put
things simply, the basic job of compliance is to ensure that a broker-dealer
and its employees comply with applicable laws and regulations.5 The
relevant laws and regulations are mainly the federal securities laws and
regulations of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC), but
they also include the rules and professional standards of self-regulatory
organizations (SROs),6 as well as the diverse kinds of laws that apply to
financial firms today (e.g., anti-money laundering rules).7 Compliance,
which is composed of compliance officers, occupies a middle position
between the business of the broker-dealer, on the one hand, and regulators
and SRO officials, on the other. Compliance officers do not engage in the
firm’s securities business, but are part of one of its oversight or control
functions, like internal accounting, internal control, and legal.8 Indeed, in its
early days compliance was a task of or a subdivision within the legal
department.9 As a result of this oversight function, investment bankers,
brokers, and other business employees of broker-dealers traditionally
looked down upon and even resented compliance officers as being an
unproductive part of, and even an impediment to, the investment banking

4. The discussion will focus on compliance only in broker-dealers, who are regulated under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp (2012), since
compliance is well developed in broker-dealers. A broker-dealer is a firm, registered as such under
the Exchange Act, id. § 78o, that, as is typical, conducts both the functions of a “broker,” which
acts as an agent for others in securities transactions, id. § 78c(a)(4), and a “dealer,” which
generally is in the business of making markets in securities, id. § 78c(a)(5).
5. See SEC. IND. ASS’N, LEGAL & COMPLIANCE DIV., WHITE PAPER ON THE ROLE OF
COMPLIANCE 2 (2005) [hereinafter SIA, WHITE PAPER ON THE ROLE OF COMPLIANCE],
available at http://www.sifma.org/uploadedfiles/societies/sifma_compliance_and_legal_society
/role_of_compliance_white_paper%20%282%29.pdf.
6. SROs are securities organizations where the members, rather than an outside body,
primarily regulate themselves. See 1 NORMAN S. POSER & JAMES A. FANTO, BROKER-DEALER
LAW AND REGULATION § 4-3 to 4-4 (4th ed. 2007 & Supp. 2013). The Securities Exchange Act of
1934 is based upon a self-regulatory model, where SROs do much of the regulation subject to the
oversight of the SEC. See id. § 4-3. The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), which
is a union of the former self-regulatory arms of the National Association of Securities Dealers (the
NASD) and the New York Stock Exchange (the NYSE), is the main SRO for broker-dealers and is
a registered securities association under section 15A of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3. At
the symposium, our opening speaker was Grace B. Vogel, FINRA’s Executive Vice President of
Member Regulation.
7. See SIA, WHITE PAPER ON THE ROLE OF COMPLIANCE, supra note 5, at 5.
8. It is true that, in smaller firms, a broker, trader, or supervisor of the firm may also be a
compliance officer because the firm is not large enough to have a separate compliance department
or group. Or, in a small firm, the only compliance officer may be engaged in multiple control
functions (e.g., be both the main privacy officer and chief anti-money laundering officer).
9. See O. Ray Vass, The Compliance Officer in Today’s Regulatory Environment, BROKERDEALER INSTITUTE, at 49 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. 579, 1987)
(discussing early configuration of compliance in firms).

4

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 8

and securities business.10 A compliance officer helps ensure that the firm
and its employees follow the laws and regulations, but he or she does not
have the status and independence of a regulator or an SRO official,
although he or she may have spent part of the career with the SEC or
FINRA and this experience may have played a role in his or her obtaining
the compliance officer position.11 Yet, as discussed below, regulators work
closely with compliance officers and may consider them their eyes and ears
in a firm.12
To a great extent, compliance in broker-dealers grew out of brokerdealers’ supervisory obligations over their personnel under the federal
securities laws.13 To show this demands a brief review of several key
statutory provisions for broker-dealers. Section 15(b)(4)(D) of the
Exchange Act empowers the SEC to discipline a broker-dealer for, among
other things, the willful violation of, or the inability to comply with, the
federal securities laws or their regulations by the broker-dealer itself or by
any person “associated with” the broker-dealer.14 If an employee of a
broker-dealer willfully violated the securities laws or regulations, the
broker-dealer would be subject to SEC discipline under this statutory
provision, which could include suspension of its registration for up to
twelve months or the “death sentence” of revocation of registration.15 This
10. See Todd L. Spillane, So You Are a Compliance Officer, Now What? PRAC. COMPLIANCE
& RISK MGMT. FOR THE SEC. INDUS., Nov.–Dec. 2010, at 1, 2–3 (describing the delicate
relationship between compliance officers and business people).
11. See PROJECT ON GOV’T OVERSIGHT, DANGEROUS LIAISONS: REVOLVING DOOR AT SEC
CREATES RISK OF REGULATORY CAPTURE 2 (2013), available at http://pogoarchives.org
/ebooks/20130211-dangerous-liaisons-sec-revolving-door.pdf (“The movement of people to and
from the financial industry is a key feature of the SEC, and it has the potential to influence the
agency’s culture and values.”). The purpose of this report is to highlight the danger of regulatory
capture, particularly as it affects decisions by regulators to pursue lawsuits against financial firms.
However, it indicates the interest of financial firms in hiring former regulators in control
functions. Many senior compliance officers have spent time with the SEC or FINRA. For
example, Jonathan Gottlieb, who was one of the alumni compliance officers present at our
symposium, formerly worked for the SEC’s Division of Enforcement.
12. See infra text accompanying note 44.
13. The focus here is only on the brokerage industry-specific origins of compliance within
broker-dealers. See generally Miriam Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV.
949, 958–75 & nn.48–162 (2009) (discussing origins of corporate compliance and referencing the
significant contributions to the scholarly literature about them). Professor Baer, who is a specialist
on the interrelationship between compliance and enforcement, among other things, was a
commentator at our symposium.
14. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(D) (2012). “Associated person” is itself defined in section
3(a)(18) of the Exchange Act to include “any partner, officer, director, or branch manager of such
broker or dealer (or any person occupying a similar status or performing similar functions), any
person directly or indirectly controlling, controlled by, or under common control with such broker
or dealer, or any employee of such broker or dealer.” Id. § 78c(a)(18). This definition sweeps
within it all those who engage in the securities business in a broker-dealer, as well as controlling
persons, but an exception (not quoted above) excludes clerical and ministerial employees, among
others. Id.
15. See generally Task Force on Broker-Dealer Supervision & Compliance of the Comm. on
Fed. Regulation of Sec., Broker-Dealer Supervision of Registered Representatives and Branch
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statutory provision thus gives a broker-dealer an incentive to supervise its
employees to ensure that they comply with applicable laws and regulations
so that it can, in fact, stay in business.
Section 15(b)(4)(D) was a rough and imperfect instrument for the SEC
to ensure legal compliance by broker-dealers and their employees because it
allows the SEC to discipline only the firm, not the violating employee, and
it does not provide for discipline of firm supervisors.16 The Securities Acts
Amendments of 1964 enhanced supervision, and gave a major impetus to
compliance, by adding sections 15(b)(4)(E) and 15(b)(6).17 Under section
15(b)(4)(E), a broker-dealer is subject to sanctions if, among other things,
it, or an associated person, willfully aided or abetted a federal securities law
or rule violation or “failed reasonably to supervise, with a view to
preventing” the violation, the person who committed the violation.18 This
amendment made the broker-dealer explicitly liable for its own, and its
associated persons’, supervisory violations. Furthermore, section 15(b)(6)
empowers the SEC to discipline an associated person who, among other
things, willfully aids and abets a violation of the federal securities laws or
who commits a supervisory violation.19 Under this provision the SEC can
discipline branch managers and other supervisors in a broker-dealer for
their failure to supervise employees under their authority. These explicit
supervisory obligations on firms and firm supervisors created an enhanced
need for a broker-dealer to have people (i.e., compliance officers) to tell the
supervisors and the other employees what compliance with the laws and
regulations entails so that the employees could conduct themselves in a
lawful manner and the supervisors could properly conduct their supervision
and avoid supervisory liability.
Even more importantly for the growth of compliance, section
15(b)(4)(E) provides both the firm—and, through section 15(b)(6), firm
supervisors—with defenses to a supervisory violation charge. It states that
“no person shall be deemed to have failed reasonably to supervise any other
person” if, first, there were “established procedures, and a system for
applying” them, “which would reasonably be expected to prevent and
detect, insofar as practicable,” any securities law violations by the
supervised person.20 It further stipulates that the supervisor has
“reasonably” to discharge the duties under the procedures and system
Office Operations, 44 BUS. LAW. 1361, 1363–64 (1989) (discussing the SEC’s early legal theories
to enforce supervisory liability upon broker-dealers, which included the standard tort doctrine of
respondeat superior).
16. See POSER & FANTO, supra note 6, § 9-5 to 9-6.
17. Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, sec. 6(b), § 15(b)(4)(E), (6), 78
Stat. 565, 571–72 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(E), (6)).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(E).
19. Id. § 78o(b)(6). This section imposes the supervisory obligation through a cross-reference
to section 15(b)(4)(E).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(E)(i).
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“without reasonable cause to believe” that the supervised person was not
complying with these procedures and system.21 This language means that
the firm and its supervisors have a statutory defense if the firm has welldrafted supervisory procedures for ensuring that the firm and all its
employees comply with securities laws and regulations, as well as a system,
that is, the resources and responsible people, to implement these
procedures. Moreover, the firm and its supervisors have to demonstrate that
they actually fulfilled their responsibilities under these procedures and
system (i.e., that the system was properly functioning and not just for
show).
This availability of the statutory defense to a charge of failure to
supervise led to the growth of compliance, since broker-dealers would have
a real interest in having a firm function—compliance—that would be
responsible for drafting the supervisory procedures and assisting the firm
and its supervisors in the implementation of the supervisory system.
Moreover, compliance officers would ensure that the last prong of the
statutory defense—that the procedures and the system were being followed
in practice—was satisfied. Firms would accomplish this by having
compliance officers monitor employees for legal compliance and follow up
on any problem or potential problem (known in the trade as a “red flag”)22
that surfaced in a firm, which could suggest a legal violation and thus
potentially a supervisory one. In sum, a firm and its supervisors can take
advantage of the statutory defense by having a compliance department, or at
least compliance officers, devoted to creating a well-functioning
supervisory system for them to follow. The origin of compliance is,
therefore, in the avoidance of supervisory liability.
SRO supervisory requirements similarly spurred the growth of
compliance in firms, although by imposing a direct supervisory obligation
on firms rather than indirectly through a defense to liability. The Exchange
Act requires SROs to ensure that their members comply with federal
securities laws and regulations, as well as with their own rules, and to have
rules designed to “prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices,
[and] to promote just and equitable principles of trade.”23 FINRA’s
requirements of supervision are extremely detailed. FINRA requires each of
its members to have “a system to supervise the activities of each registered

21. Id. § 78o(b)(4)(E)(ii).
22. A “red flag” is an unusual event or practice that could be a sign of a securities violation
and, therefore, that must be monitored or investigated. See, e.g., Gutfreund, Exchange Act Release
No. 31,554, 1992 WL 362753, at *12 (Dec. 3, 1992) [hereinafter Gutfreund] (red flags are
“‘suggestions’ of irregularity”).
23. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(2), (6) (for securities associations); id. § 78f(b)(1), (5) (for
exchanges). The SEC reviews the rules in connection with the registration of an association or an
exchange, as well as ongoing proposed rule changes or ones initiated by the SEC. See id.
§ 78s(a)–(c).
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representative, registered principal,24 and other associated person that is
reasonably designed to achieve compliance” with securities laws and
regulations and FINRA rules.25 Among other things, the system requires a
broker-dealer to have written procedures for the supervision of each of its
securities businesses and associated persons (written supervisory
procedures or WSPs), to designate supervisors for each regulated business,
to have annual compliance reviews for each registered representative and
principal, to have internal inspections of all offices, to have a principal
review of the transactions and correspondence with the public of registered
representatives relating to their securities business, and to investigate the
character and qualifications of any associated person.26 Since SRO rules
govern each securities business activity and dictate how it is to be
conducted in accordance with the law, nearly every FINRA rule has
supervisory and, therefore, compliance implications.27 FINRA rules grow or
are modified each year as firms develop new businesses and products and as
new legal obligations are imposed upon them.28 A broker-dealer must have
a division or group of employees—in other words, compliance—who can
keep track of all of the legal and regulatory duties of the firm and associated
24. “Principals” are associated persons “who are actively engaged in the management of the
member’s investment banking or securities business, including supervision, solicitation, conduct
of business or the training of persons associated with a member for any of these functions are
designated as principals.” See NASD Rules, FINRA, http://finra.complinet.com/en/display
/display_viewall.html?rbid=2403&element_id=605&record_id=607 (last visited Nov. 17, 2013)
[hereinafter NASD Rules] (NASD Rule 1021(b)). As a result of the consolidation of the NASD
and the regulatory arm of the NYSE into FINRA, a new FINRA rulebook combining the rules of
each of these SROs is being prepared and implemented. See FINRA, FINRA MANUAL: OFFICIAL
PUBLICATION OF THE FINANCIAL INDUSTRY REGULATORY AUTHORITY (2011) [hereinafter
FINRA MANUAL]. As a result, currently FINRA rules include some NASD rules, some NYSE
rules (which apply only to broker-dealers formerly regulated by the NYSE), and the new FINRA
rules (the latter apply to all broker-dealers). See id. at 21–111 (providing comprehensive
conversion tables between the NASD, NYSE, and FINRA Rules). Associated persons who are not
principals are generally “representatives,” a term defined to mean
[p]ersons associated with a member, including assistant officers other than principals, who
are engaged in the investment banking or securities business for the member including the
functions of supervision, solicitation or conduct of business in securities or who are engaged
in the training of persons associated with a member for any of these functions are designated
as representatives.

NASD Rules, supra note 24 (NASD Rule 1031(b)).
25. See NASD Rules, supra note 24 (NASD Rule 3010(a)).
26. See id. (NASD Rule 3010(a)–(e)).
27. See, e.g., FINRA, Deferred Variable Annuities, Reg. Notice No. 07-53, at 7 (Nov. 2007),
available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices
/p037421.pdf (discussing supervision involved with new rule on the sale or exchange of variable
annuities).
28. See, e.g., FINRA, Customer Assets, Reg. Notice No. 09-64 (Nov. 2009), available at
https://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/p120372.pdf
(discussing enhanced supervision in light of, among other things, cases involving
misappropriation of customer assets).
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persons and who can help the firm’s employees satisfy their obligations,
and the supervisors their supervisory duties, through guidance, monitoring,
and follow-up.
Moreover, NASD Rule 3012 requires that a firm have one or more
principals who set up supervisory controls to test its supervisory system on
a yearly basis in order to assess its compliance effectiveness and to identify
the need for additional WSPs.29 Under this rule, the responsible principal or
principals establish the controls, conduct the testing, create additional WSPs
to respond to weaknesses revealed by the testing, and report annually to a
broker-dealer’s senior management about the results.30 The controls must
cover (i) customer account activity conducted by branch office managers
and other supervisors; (ii) customer account activity, such as the transmittal
of funds or securities, address changes, and changes of investment
objectives; and (iii) heightened supervision of certain “producing
managers” who generate a significant portion of the revenue of a particular
business unit.31 This kind of supervisory control system and related testing
requires compliance specialists who understand supervisory and compliance
systems and potential weaknesses in them and who follow industry
developments with respect to their improvement. In addition, FINRA Rule
3130 (former NASD Rule 3013) requires a firm to appoint at least one chief
compliance officer (CCO).32 Under this rule, a firm’s chief executive officer
(CEO) must also certify annually that there are “in place processes to
establish, maintain, review, test and modify written compliance policies and
written supervisory procedures reasonably designed to achieve compliance
with” SRO rules and federal securities laws and regulations, and FINRA
Rule 3130 requires that the CEO has had “one or more meetings” with the
CCO in the preceding twelve months to discuss the processes.33 This latter
rule is both a regulatory acknowledgment of the importance of compliance
and an effort to increase its importance and visibility in the management of
broker-dealers. The CCO became the standard bearer of compliance in the
managerial ranks of the firm.

29. See NASD Rules, supra note 24 (NASD Rule 3012(a)(1)). The initial spark for this rule
was a notable failure of supervision where, undetected, a broker misappropriated over $100
million in customer money for over fifteen years. See Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange
Act Release No. 49,883, 2004 WL 1574002 (June 17, 2004), at *1 (recounting SG Cowen Sec.
Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 48,335, 2003 WL 21946839 (Aug. 14, 2003)).
30. See NASD Rules, supra note 24 (NASD Rule 3012(a)(1)).
31. See id. (NASD Rule 3012(a)(2)).
32. See FINRA MANUAL, supra note 24, at 5111 (FINRA Rule 3130(a)); NASD, Notice to
Members No. 04-79, at 974 (Nov. 2004), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups
/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/p011955.pdf (“NASD Rule 3013 is intended to
bolster attention to members’ compliance programs by requiring substantial and purposeful
interaction between business and compliance officers throughout the firm.”).
33. See FINRA MANUAL, supra note 24, at 5111 (FINRA Rule 3130(b)). The rule also
provides a “model” certification for the CEO. See id. at 5111–12 (FINRA Rule 3130(c)).
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In their separate ways, therefore, the Exchange Act requirements and
SRO rules helped transform compliance into a specialized function within
broker-dealers. In the early days of compliance, firm supervisors, aided by
in-house lawyers and outside counsel, ensured that their firm and
employees complied with the securities laws and regulations, as well as
SRO rules and standards.34 This model is still found in small broker-dealers,
which operate with fewer resources than do large firms and where, for cost
reasons, firm supervisors and other employees often wear multiple hats,
including that of the CCO.35 However, compliance has become an
increasingly specialized occupation in larger firms, as the SEC and the
SROs pushed them to have a compliance function that reflects their size and
activities.36 The increase in the number and complexity of financial
activities of larger firms and the accompanying growth in laws and
regulations relating to them mean that firm supervisors can no longer stay
current with all of the legal, regulatory, and SRO responsibilities of their
firm and associated persons.37 They thus have to create and then rely upon a
specialized department within the firm, compliance, whose officers can
devote most of their time and efforts to the compliance tasks.
As for the tasks of the typical compliance officer, first and foremost, he
or she provides advice, on a daily basis, to brokers and their supervisors on
the compliance requirements for business activities.38 A major, and indeed
monumental, job of compliance officers is also to produce, and to keep
current, the WSPs.39 To accomplish this task, compliance officers must
work closely with business employees to understand a particular business
activity, for the WSPs dictate how firm employees should conduct the firm
so as to comply with laws and regulations and how the activity should be
supervised and monitored. In many ways, then, the typical WSP is a stepby-step guide to the activity (e.g., how a broker should conduct a sale, how
a firm can do advertising, and how must a trade be processed). Compliance
officers must also refine existing WSPs in response to problems or gaps in
them revealed by the firm’s experience, by the testing mandated by NASD
34. See generally SIA, WHITE PAPER ON THE ROLE OF COMPLIANCE, supra note 5, at 1.
35. See id. at 2–3 (discussing different compliance needs and structure of small firms). Smaller
firms may also “outsource” some of their compliance tasks. Id. at 2 n.10.
36. See, e.g., Prudential Sec., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 33,082, 1993 WL 430273, at
*27 (Oct. 21, 1993) (requiring firm to have a compliance function to reflect its business).
37. See generally SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. ASS’N, THE EVOLVING ROLE OF COMPLIANCE 18
(2013) [hereinafter SIFMA, THE EVOLVING ROLE OF COMPLIANCE], available at
http://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/WilmerHale_Shared_Content/Files/PDFs/SIFMAevolving-role-of-compliance-2013.pdf (discussing different compliance models). An early writer
on financial firm compliance observed that it took shape as a specialized activity in the early
1960s. See Vass, supra note 9, at 54.
38. See SIA, WHITE PAPER ON THE ROLE OF COMPLIANCE, supra note 5, at 3; see also Vass,
supra note 9, at 56 (referring to compliance, not pejoratively, as a “dumping ground” for firm
issues) (internal quotation marks omitted).
39. See SIA, WHITE PAPER ON THE ROLE OF COMPLIANCE, supra note 5, at 4.
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Rule 3012, or as a result of issues in them raised by FINRA or the SEC
because of their inspection of a firm or because of the regulator’s concern
over industry-wide matters.40 Since new laws and regulations appear
constantly, the production and refinement of WSPs are never-ending tasks.
Compliance officers monitor the activities of brokers, often through the
production and review of reports on transactions, to determine whether the
procedures are in fact being followed.41 Today, compliance monitoring is
aided by technology, which has greatly automated the reporting and review
process.42 Compliance officers identify, and then follow up on, compliance
problems or “red flags.” Compliance officers are responsible, through their
surveillance, for finding out when the WSPs are not being followed, which
may be due to anything from an innocent mistake, to purposeful, but not
harmful, noncompliance, to outright fraud. Compliance officers also detect
problems through the routine internal inspections of offices and branches
that are part of the supervisory system.43 Moreover, they are usually the
firm personnel who assist SROs, the SEC, and other regulators in regulatory
examinations of their firms, and as a result they may detect problems, or at
least regulatory concerns, through their interaction with the examiners.44
Here, the work of compliance touches on the sensitive subject of
enforcement of the securities and other laws and potential reporting of
illegality to FINRA and the SEC. Although compliance officers may
identify problems from their monitoring and inspections and assist in the
conduct of investigations, the determination as to what to do about the
violations generally belongs to firm supervisors.45
It is worthwhile to raise here an important issue about the relationship
between supervision and compliance that has not been definitively resolved.
Supervision refers to the power of one person over another in a firm’s chain
of command, which includes, as discussed above, the obligation to ensure
40. See id.
41. See id. at 4–5. This is often referred to as compliance’s “control,” as opposed to
“advisory,” function. See SIFMA, THE EVOLVING ROLE OF COMPLIANCE, supra note 37, at 4. The
most significant monitoring report is the “exception” report, which lists transactions that are
outside certain parameters specified by the WSPs or that are otherwise flagged as suspicious, such
as excessive trading or inappropriate concentration of certain products in customer accounts. See
Vass, supra note 9, at 12 (discussing exception report).
42. For an excellent discussion of problems inherent in the use of technology in compliance,
see Kenneth A. Bamberger, Technologies of Compliance: Risk and Regulation in a Digital Age,
88 TEX. L. REV. 669 (2010).
43. See NASD Rules, supra note 24 (NASD Rule 3010(c)); see also SIA, WHITE PAPER ON
THE ROLE OF COMPLIANCE, supra note 5, at 5; SIFMA, THE EVOLVING ROLE OF COMPLIANCE,
supra note 37, at 24–25.
44. See also SIA, WHITE PAPER ON THE ROLE OF COMPLIANCE, supra note 5, at 6; SIFMA,
THE EVOLVING ROLE OF COMPLIANCE, supra note 37, at 26. A broker-dealer is subject to
examination both by the SEC and FINRA, on a regular basis, as well as “for cause” (i.e., as a
result of a complaint) or because of an overall investigation into brokerage practices. For a general
discussion of this subject, see POSER & FANTO, supra note 6.
45. See SIFMA, THE EVOLVING ROLE OF COMPLIANCE, supra note 37, at 9–10.
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that the supervised employee complies with securities laws and
regulations.46 It is often typified by the power of the supervisor to control
the actions of, and ultimately to dismiss, an employee.47 Compliance in a
broker-dealer is not, without more, part of the supervisory structure, and a
compliance officer is not, again without more, a supervisor. Rather, as
explained above, compliance makes effective supervision possible.
Compliance officers are not themselves supervisors insofar as they do not
tell employees what to do or make disciplinary decisions when a violation
is found—those actions are for the supervisors, and investigations are
generally for legal officers. However, the SEC has held that, once a
compliance or legal officer has a sufficient position of influence within a
firm, he or she may have the responsibility, with other supervisors, for
taking appropriate action in response to misconduct.48 This action could
include, in extreme circumstances such as when the main supervisors do not
adequately respond to the misconduct, escalating the matter to the board of
directors, resigning, or reporting the problem to regulatory authorities.49
Since there has been a notable recent instance where a compliance officer
was alleged to be a supervisor,50 it has been recommended that compliance
46. See SIA, WHITE PAPER ON THE ROLE OF COMPLIANCE, supra note 5, at 10.
47. See Huff, Exchange Act Release No. 29,017, 1991 WL 296561, at *9 (Mar. 28, 1991). In a
seminal SEC decision on this subject, Gutfreund, the SEC made the following observation in the
context of discussing the supervisory responsibilities of legal and compliance officers, which
offers a broader view than the control standard:
Employees of brokerage firms who have legal or compliance responsibilities do not
become “supervisors” for purposes of Sections 15(b)(4)(E) and 15(b)(6) solely because
they occupy those positions. Rather, determining if a particular person is a “supervisor”
depends on whether, under the facts and circumstances of a particular case, that person has
a requisite degree of responsibility, ability or authority to affect the conduct of the
employee whose behavior is at issue.

See Gutfreund, supra note 22, at *15 (emphasis added).
48. See Gutfreund, supra note 22, at *14.
49. See id. at *16. Arguably, the position taken by the SEC in the Urban case discussed below
is broader than the two traditional theories of “control” and “affect,” since it finds supervisory
liability when a person, such as a compliance officer, has “authority” in the firm, i.e., is listened
to. See Urban, Initial Decision Release No. 402, 2010 WL 3500928, at *38 (Sept. 8, 2010)
[hereinafter Urban].
50. Urban, supra note 49. Urban, who was a general counsel and also the CCO of a brokerdealer, attempted to take action against a rogue broker, who engaged in numerous legal violations,
including unauthorized trading in client accounts and doing trades for a stock manipulator. Id. at
*1, *13. Urban urged that the broker be dismissed, but he was overruled by the head of retail sales
who agreed to supervise him personally. Id. at *21. The broker ultimately left the firm in the wake
of numerous customer problems that resulted in a significant financial outlay by the broker-dealer.
Id. at *25. Urban was charged with a supervisory violation. Id. at *38. The administrative law
judge ruled that he was in fact a supervisor, but that he had fulfilled his supervisory
responsibilities. Id. at *44–48. At the urging of the Enforcement Division, the SEC declined to
affirm the judge’s ruling, stating, among other things, that it needed to consider whether it was
enough for Urban to report problems to the supervisor of the broker or whether he should have
escalated the matter to the firm’s chief executive officer and its board of directors. See Urban,
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officers ensure that there is clear reporting structure in their firm, which
shows that they are outside the supervisory structure.51
Furthermore, compliance officers serve as educators within the brokerdealer. Brokers have a continuing education obligation,52 and every broker
must certify annually that he or she is in compliance with applicable laws
and regulations.53 Compliance officers are generally responsible for
obtaining this certification (or for monitoring the technology permitting it),
and they must provide, or arrange for the provision of, the necessary
continuing education.54 They are also involved in workforce training when
new products or a new business line are being introduced, which requires
education for brokers about how to sell the products or do the new business
in compliance with the law.55 Compliance officers also conduct training in
professional and ethical standards as well as produce and administer a code
of ethical conduct for the firm.56 In this role, they may be asked to provide
advice on ethical issues, as well as on matters that fall within the grey areas
of the law.
The position of compliance officer in a broker-dealer is indeed diverse,
often entailing such varied roles as advisor to employees involved in the
securities business, transcriber of WSPs, monitor and investigator of
problems, and ethical counselor. It is no wonder that this position has
assumed a growing importance in firms, a subject to which I shall now turn.

Exchange Act Release No. 63,456, 2010 WL 5092728 (Dec. 7, 2010) (order denying motion for
summary affirmance). Eventually, the SEC dismissed the proceedings because, with three
members recusing themselves, the other two split on the decision. See Urban, Exchange Act
Release No. 66,259, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3366, 2012 WL 1024025 (Jan 26,
2012) (order dismissing proceeding). The case raised concern among practitioners that compliance
officers were being inappropriately pulled into the supervisory structure of a firm. See, e.g., David
C. Prince, NSCP Files Amicus Brief with SEC in Theodore W. Urban Case, NSCP CURRENTS,
Nov.–Dec. 2010, at 1, available at http://www.netacn.com/documents/nov-dec-2010.pdf
(discussing position of the National Society of Compliance Professionals on this case).
51. See SIFMA, THE EVOLVING ROLE OF COMPLIANCE, supra note 37, at 17.
52. For a discussion of the continuing education obligations of broker-dealers and their
registered representatives, see POSER & FANTO, supra note 6, § 6-56.10 to 6-56.12. These
requirements are set out in FINRA Rule 1250. Generally, a broker has an obligation to fulfill a
continuing education requirement every three years. See FINRA MANUAL, supra note 24, at
3115–20.
53. See NASD Rules, supra note 24 (NASD Rule 3010(a)(7)).
54. See SIA, WHITE PAPER ON THE ROLE OF COMPLIANCE, supra note 5, at 4.
55. See id. at 7.
56. See id.; SIFMA, THE EVOLVING ROLE OF COMPLIANCE, supra note 37, at 27–28. In
addition, compliance officers have many specialized functions too numerous to discuss here: for
example, they oversee the screening process and background checks for employees, as well as
their licensing and qualifications; they establish and oversee anti-money laundering and Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act programs; they establish control programs for the safeguarding of customer
nonpublic personal information; and they oversee procedures designed to prevent insider trading
and other conflicts of interest. See generally id. at 24–26.
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II. THE GROWING IMPORTANCE OF COMPLIANCE
Compliance officers are thus in every broker-dealer, which now number
approximately 4200 firms.57 Since under FINRA rules every firm must have
a CCO,58 the number of brokerage employees engaged primarily in
compliance is, at a minimum, equal to the number of firms. Larger firms are
likely to have more compliance officers because their businesses are diverse
and complex and thus demand a more developed compliance function.59
Many of those who have the position of compliance officer or CCO in
smaller firms have other jobs and do not devote themselves fulltime to
compliance.60 Compliance officers work in all kinds of organizational
structures, depending upon the size and businesses of a firm.61 In large
broker-dealers, they would generally be in a separate department or division
under the CCO and thus in a separate reporting line from brokers. Although
there is not extensive information available about compliance
compensation,62 the data shows that it is less than compensation for bankers
and brokers because it is not based directly on business results.63 However,
the gap between compliance and business personnel has diminished as
compensation for compliance officers has increased in recent years.64

57. According to FINRA statistics, which are the most recent as of October 2013, there are
4195 member firms, with 162,808 branch offices and 634,955 registered representatives. See
FINRA Statistics, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/Statistics/ (last updated July 12, 2013).
The firms fall into four rough categories: (i) approximately 200 large firms, which historically
were members of the New York Stock Exchange, which have most of the customer assets and
most of the industry’s revenue and which are often in large financial groups; (ii) mid-sized, fullline firms, which are generally regional; (iii) discount brokerage firms; and (iv) smaller firms,
sometimes operating with only few brokers. See SIFMA, FACT BOOK 2009, at 43 (2009)
(discussing the kinds of broker-dealers).
58. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
59. For a description of compliance at Goldman Sachs, see Our Divisions: Global
Compliance, GOLDMAN SACHS, http://www.goldmansachs.com/careers/why-goldman-sachs/ourdivisions/global-compliance/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2013).
60. Cf. NAT’L REGULATORY SERVS., NRS COMPLIANCE COMPENSATION STUDY 2011, at 5
(2011) [hereinafter NAT’L REGULATORY SERVS.], available at http://www.nrs-inc.com/Global
/White%20Papers/NRS%20Compliance%20Compensation%20Study%202011_web.pdf
(reporting that even CCOs in major firms spend only half of their time on compliance).
61. See generally SIFMA, THE EVOLVING ROLE OF COMPLIANCE, supra note 37, at 17–18
(discussing the various compliance structures used).
62. See generally NAT’L REGULATORY SERVS., supra note 60, at 5 (providing general survey
data on compliance compensation); SOC’Y OF CORP. COMPLIANCE & ETHICS, 2012 CROSS
INDUSTRY CHIEF COMPLIANCE OFFICERS SALARY SURVEY 19 (2012) (indicating average
compensation for CCOs in financial services to be approximately $165,000); see also
Occupational Employment Statistics, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT., http://www.bls.gov/oes/current
/oes131041.htm (reporting the mean annual wage of compliance officers in other financial
services as $64,960).
63. INST. OF INT’L FIN. IN COLLABORATION WITH OLIVER WYMAN, COMPENSATION REFORM
IN WHOLESALE BANKING 2010: PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING GLOBAL STANDARDS 22–23
(2010), available at http://www.iif.com/download.php?id=lcQmuRRwWEM= .
64. Id. (discussing the narrowing gap between compensation of business employees and those
in control functions). Compliance officer compensation has recently stabilized. See NAT’L
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Compliance gained in importance as a result of the financial crisis. The
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010
(Dodd-Frank), with its accompanying SEC regulations, has resulted in more
work for compliance because compliance officers have to translate the new
laws and regulations into WSPs with accompanying monitoring, reporting,
and inspections.65 In addition, after the crisis, regulators and SROs have
increased their oversight of financial firms and their enforcement of the
laws, rules, and standards, which increases the work of compliance officers.
Both the SEC and FINRA revamped their examinations of broker-dealers
with, among other things, the involvement of more specialist examiners, the
sharing of information among divisions (including the enforcement
division), and more examinations targeting firms with the highest risks.66
The SEC beefed up its enforcement function by forming prosecutorial
groups focusing on particular kinds of financial institutions and specific
abuses.67 This examination and enforcement activity demands the attention
of the compliance officer, who generally is the point person for the firm in
regulatory examinations and who assists the firm’s legal officers in
responding to enforcement inquiries.
Congress in Dodd-Frank and the SEC in its regulations also use the
existing model of broker-dealer compliance for previously unregulated
financial participants. For instance, a significant part of the legislation
involved the regulation of the swap markets and their major participants.68
REGULATORY SERVS., supra note 60, at 2 (noting that compensation for compliance professionals
has stagnated since 2008, despite new regulatory demands).
65. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
66. The requirement to enhance examinations was primarily motivated by the SEC’s failure to
detect the Bernard Madoff scandal, which was revealed when his Ponzi scheme collapsed during
the crisis. See POSER & FANTO, supra note 6, § 7-60 to 7-64. The SEC’s enhancement of
examinations was mandated by Congress in Dodd-Frank section 929U, which, among other
things, added a new section 4E of the Exchange Act. See Dodd-Frank Act sec. 4E, § 929U, 124
Stat. at 1867–68 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78d-5 (2012)). This provision required
specialized examiners for the SEC’s Division of Trading and Markets, which oversees brokerdealers. Id. On the SEC’s risk-based examination system, see SEC, FISCAL YEAR 2012 AGENCY
FINANCIAL REPORT 3 (2012) [hereinafter SEC FISCAL YEAR 2012 REPORT], available at
http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secafr2012.pdf. On FINRA’s enhancement to its own
examinations in reaction to the scandal, see FINRA SPECIAL REVIEW COMM., REPORT OF THE
2009 SPECIAL REVIEW COMMITTEE ON FINRA’S EXAMINATION PROGRAM IN LIGHT OF THE
STANFORD AND MADOFF SCHEMES 6–8 (2009), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups
/corporate/@corp/documents/corporate/p120078.pdf.
67. See, e.g., Robert S. Khuzami, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, SEC, Remarks at News
Conference Announcing Enforcement Cooperation Initiative and New Senior Leaders (Jan. 13,
2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch011310rsk.htm (introducing the
directors of the five new National Specialized Units (Asset Management, Market Abuse,
Structured and New Products, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and Municipal Securities and Public
Pension)).
68. See Dodd-Frank Act tit. 7, §§ 721–74, 124 Stat. 1658–1802. Swap regulation was divided
between the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the SEC, depending upon the nature of
the underlying asset that was the subject of the swap.
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Swap dealers are now regulated in a manner that, understandably enough,
parallels, and is modeled on, that of broker-dealers.69 As a result, a swap
dealer must have a supervisory structure and record-keeping, which
naturally demand a compliance function.70 Dodd-Frank has thus ushered in
a whole new era for compliance, albeit particularly in financial firms like
investment advisers and swap dealers.
That compliance officers now have a significant place in broker-dealers
means that ultimately the regulatory burden emanating from the crisis will
fall on them. As a result of the financial crisis, as discussed above,
legislators, regulators, and FINRA officials have shown a renewed zeal for
law creation and enforcement,71 but their efforts will eventually wane.
Legislators become distracted with other, more pressing concerns. The SEC
has limited resources in this time of scarcity, and its budget is neither
growing nor likely to grow significantly in the future.72 FINRA has
improved its oversight over broker-dealers.73 Yet while the SRO is closer to
these firms, its examiners and enforcement staff are not in them on a day-today basis.
Compliance officers, by contrast, are in the firms, and, as discussed
above, they are specifically charged with legal, professional, and ethical
compliance.74 Most importantly, they actually see what is occurring in the
firms. They are thus well situated to alert supervisors and senior executives
to growing problems, such as the securitization of subprime loans, which
may infiltrate the financial industry and gradually grow into a dreaded and
resented financial crisis. Being involved with compliance and assisting in
the supervision of every broker and securities activity in a broker-dealer, a
compliance officer is well positioned to identify such problems perhaps
before they are transformed into larger, potentially systemic issues.
Furthermore, given the sheer number of new laws and regulations imposed
upon broker-dealers as a result of the most recent financial crisis, the
brokerage industry could not survive without compliance officers. The
compliance officer today in a broker-dealer does not generally have to
worry about remaining employed, but he or she is likely to be overwhelmed
with work.75 A question posed by the symposium is whether the legal
academy can help him or her with the burden.
69. See POSER & FANTO, supra note 6, § 5-40 to 5-44.1.
70. Indeed, new section 15F(k) of the Exchange Act dealing with security-based swap dealer
regulation mandates that such a dealer have a CCO to implement compliance in the dealer. See 15
U.S.C. § 78o-10(k).
71. See supra notes 66–67.
72. For a description of the SEC’s lack of adequate financial resources for its mission in recent
years, see SEC, STRATEGIC PLAN: FISCAL YEARS 2010–2015, at 6–7 (2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/about/secstratplan1015f.pdf.
73. See SEC FISCAL YEAR 2012 REPORT, supra note 66, at 48.
74. See supra text accompanying notes 38–56.
75. See SIFMA, THE EVOLVING ROLE OF COMPLIANCE, supra note 37, at 18–19.
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III. COMPLIANCE AND THE LEGAL ACADEMY
There has been little work on financial compliance in the legal
academy. It is not that scholars have ignored compliance entirely. Indeed,
there have been scholarly articles written on compliance in public
corporations, including studies with the approach of New Governance—an
academic movement encouraging regulators and the regulated to produce
more effective regulation by cooperating in rule-making.76 Many New
Governance insights can be brought to the financial area and could be
applied to the role of compliance in the development of cooperative
regulation. In addition, there has been considerable academic work about
how the emphasis on enforcement and prosecution adversely affects
regulation, including the regulation of financial institutions.77 This is
relevant to financial firm compliance insofar as compliance officers can be
enlisted in the SEC’s and FINRA’s enforcement efforts, as well as
prosecution by the U.S. Department of Justice.78 Despite these fruitful areas
of scholarly activity with their occasional references to financial
compliance, there has been little sustained attention to this subject.
Given the nature of the legal academy and its relationship to legal
practice, this lack of attention is not surprising. Compliance is part of the
day-to-day operations of broker-dealers and is a technical feature of brokerdealer practice. Law professors who specialize in securities law spend most
of their time on issues related to capital raising and public company
disclosure and considerably less time on market structure and particularly
on market intermediaries.79 Their orientation may reflect the traditional
desired destination of the students of elite schools, the large corporate law
firms that focus primarily upon financing and transactions,80 not on the

76. See generally Orly Lobel, New Governance as Regulatory Governance, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF GOVERNANCE 65 (David Levi-Faur ed., 2012).
77. See generally Miriam Baer, Organizational Liability and the Tension Between Corporate
and Criminal Law, 19 J.L. & POL’Y 1 (2010) (arguing that the emphasis on prosecutorial
discretion as a means of rehabilitating corporate wrongdoers creates the potential for waste and
abuse and detracts from the need for corporate and securities laws that decrease the underlying
risks of criminal misconduct); John Hasnas, Managing the Risks of Legal Compliance: Conflicting
Demands of Law and Ethics, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 507, 517 (2008) (“[T]he use of extrinsic
punishment and rewards by the command-and-control approach undermines the intrinsic
motivation necessary to the self-regulatory approach.”).
78. See SIFMA, THE EVOLVING ROLE OF COMPLIANCE, supra note 37, at 35 (discussing
regulators’ “deputizing” compliance officers as their agents).
79. This is exemplified by the coverage in securities law textbooks. For example, one
prominent book spends about 450 pages on capital raising and about 140 pages on securities
markets and broker-dealers. See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & HILLARY A. SALE, SECURITIES
REGULATION (12th ed. 2012).
80. On the destination of elite school graduates, see LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, LAW IN
AMERICA: A SHORT HISTORY 167 (2002). See also Ralph Nader, Corporate Law Firms and the
Perversion of Justice: What Public Interest Lawyers Can Do About It, 1 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y
53 (1999).
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operations of intermediaries like broker-dealers or securities exchanges.81
Moreover, even scholars who occasionally study intermediaries are likely to
be interested in legal issues like fiduciary duties that are more academic and
jurisprudential, rather than in the day-to-day operations of compliance
departments.82 The relative lack of attention in the legal academy to
compliance may also reflect that compliance as a field was not traditionally
the exclusive domain of lawyers, but included operations and back office
personnel.83 Finally, my personal impression is that few legal academics
today come to law teaching from as specialized a practice background as
financial firm compliance. They are thus not likely to have the experience
to write about it.
Things may now be changing. There is an employment reason for this
transformation because there is a perception, whether it is right or wrong,
that financial firm compliance offers job opportunities for students in this
difficult employment environment. This may be true since, given the sheer
number of regulations that compliance must handle, it is useful for
compliance officers to have legal training. Indeed, law schools are now
entering into the process of training students for compliance positions84 and
providing externships with financial regulators or within compliance
departments of financial firms.85 Moreover, since law schools are feeling
the pressure to prepare their students for the practicing world that awaits
them, they might provide a transition course in compliance for students
entering the field.86 Thus, this perceived need to teach about compliance
may spur more scholarly focus on the subject, and it was precisely to
stimulate this scholarly work that the symposium was organized.
This new academic focus on compliance may be beneficial. As has
been explained above, compliance officers occupy a difficult, but important,
position in financial firms, translating the laws and regulations into actual
firm practice and serving as an intermediary between the regulators and the
regulated.87 It would be valuable if academics could reflect upon this role
81. See Sida Liu, The Legal Profession as a Social Process: A Theory on Lawyers and
Globalization, 38 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 670, 681 (2013) (discussing what elite corporate firms do).
82. See, e.g., Arthur Laby, Selling Advice and Creating Expectations: Why Brokers Should Be
Fiduciaries, 87 WASH. L. REV. 707 (2012). Professor Laby, a former SEC staff member, is one of
the few professors who understands compliance, but even his work centers more on properly legal
topics like fiduciary duty.
83. But see Vass, supra note 9, at 55 (“In the earlier years, persons who served as internal
general counsels were often also designated as Compliance officers.”).
84. The Regulatory Compliance Association offers online education in asset management
compliance in conjunction with law schools. See Law & Masters Degree, REG. COMPLIANCE
ASS’N, https://www.rcaonline.org/law-masters-degree/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2013).
85. Our own law school has for a long time offered externships with FINRA, the SEC, and
financial firms.
86. The author offers such a course at Brooklyn Law School together with compliance officers
and other specialists in the compliance field. It is entitled “An Introduction to Compliance and
Risk Management in Financial Institutions.”
87. See supra Part II.
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with all the imagination (and without the concern about not offending their
clients) that they typically bring to the task. This attention could of course
have unpredictable results because it is certainly possible that they would
criticize compliance and even argue that it be reduced in firms. To give an
example, Professor Birdthistle, who was a participant in our symposium,
has co-written an article with Professor Todd Henderson of the University
of Chicago.88 In this paper, among other things, they criticize the
compliance industry as part of their overall criticism of FINRA’s
transformation from an SRO into a quasi-governmental regulator.89 Their
implication is that compliance officers and compliance consultants, often
drawn from regulators and FINRA, do not want to challenge the current
regulatory status quo of FINRA’s dominance since they profit from it, even
if this situation is not the best for the financial industry and investors.90
Alternatively, law professors could look critically at the current
functioning of compliance, identify issues or problems in it, and suggest
how compliance officers could address these issues and improve their
performance. Legal academics are particularly useful in this regard, again
because they are not beholden to specific clients and because they take a
broad view of the subject matter, which might enable them to see trends and
issues not clear to those “in the trenches.” This kind of scholarly work was
evident at the symposium. Professor Barbara Black, a noted securities
scholar who has longstanding experience with FINRA’s disciplinary
proceedings through her participation on its National Adjudicatory Council,
reflected upon the compliance-specific implications of FINRA sanctions,
which are expressly remedial rather than punitive.91 Professor Jerry
Markham raised an issue that has been the subject of considerable concern
in the compliance industry throughout financial services: the safe custody
of customer assets.92
As he identified, the issue has surfaced in failures or scandals in
different kinds of financial firms, such as broker-dealers, investment
advisers, and commodities firms, where the firms inappropriately used or

88. See William A. Birdthistle & M. Todd Henderson, Becoming a Fifth Branch, 99 CORNELL
L. REV. 1 (2013). Professor Birdthistle, who was sick on the day of the symposium, spoke by
videoconference.
89. See id. at 44–49.
90. See id. at 48.
91. See Barbara Black, Punishing Bad Brokers: Self-Regulation and FINRA Sanctions, 8
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 23, 46 (2013).
92. This is because, perhaps starting with the Bernard Madoff case, there have been repeated
cases of financial firms either stealing customer assets or using them improperly. The most recent
case was MF Global, where customer assets were used essentially to prop up the firm, which was
failing because of its bets on European government securities. See Report of Investigation of
Louis J. Freeh, Chapter 11 Trustee of MF Global Holdings, Ltd. et al., In re MF Global Holdings
Ltd., No. 11-15059 (MG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2013), available at
http://www.mfglobalcaseinfo.com/pdflib/1279_15059.pdf (discussing the scandal).
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simply misappropriated customer assets.93 Professor Markham provided an
overview of this problem and the regulatory responses to it, which could
help in the reform process as regulators decide upon the most effective
approach to safeguarding customer assets. Professor Deborah DeMott
examined the position of the CCO and its importance in enhancing the
firm’s reputation.94
Legal scholars could also aid compliance because they often bring
insights from other academic disciplines into their legal analysis. One of the
most prominent academics who has often drawn insights from psychology
and organizational studies is Professor Donald Langevoort, who at our
symposium offered comments on other professors’ papers.95 He intriguingly
raised the point that compliance’s task of helping to ensure that financial
firm employees comply with the law is all the more challenging because of
the very nature of the business employees. He meant here physical nature,
citing intriguing work on the neurological basis of financial risk-taking. In a
similarly broad vein, Professor Tamar Frankel (albeit through a proxy, since
she could not attend the symposium because of the weather) explored the
beneficial effect of codes of conduct in changing the culture of regulated
investment funds with respect to deterring insider trading.96 From her
typically broad perspective, which incorporates learning from ethical
studies, she offered thoughts on why the codes work in this situation, which
could serve as a model for other financial firms wishing to have effective
codes.97
I offered my own psychologically based reflections on compliance at
the symposium. To take one case discussed above, compliance officers
spend a lot of time drafting and revising WSPs and then monitoring the
brokers’ compliance with them.98 Despite these detailed directions and
monitoring, it is not possible for compliance officers to cover every topic
and to oversee all activity in brokerage operations. Indeed, this kind of
extensive direction and oversight might even have a negative effect in a
field like brokerage, many of whose activities are not routine, and which
benefits from the discretion and independence given to its employees.99 If
93. See Jerry W. Markham, Custodial Requirements for Customer Funds, 8 BROOK. J. CORP.
FIN. & COM. L. 92 (2013).
94. See Deborah A. DeMott, The Crucial But (Potentially) Precarious Position of the Chief
Compliance Officer, 8 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 56 (2013).
95. See, e.g., Donald Langevoort, Chasing the Greased Pig down Wall Street: A Gatekeeper’s
Guide to the Psychology, Culture, and Ethics of Financial Risk Taking, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1209
(2011).
96. See Tamar Frankel, Self-Regulation of Insider-Trading in Mutual Funds and Advisers, 8
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 80 (2013).
97. See id. at 90.
98. See supra text accompanying notes 41–45.
99. See Gary R. Weaver & Linda Klebe Treviño, Compliance and Values Oriented Ethics
Programs: Influences on Employees’ Attitudes and Behavior, 9 BUS. ETHICS Q. 315, 329–30
(1999) (explaining the problems with all-encompassing compliance programs).
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the WSPs produce too much routine behavior and the monitoring is too
heavy-handed, brokers and bankers may see the compliance procedures as
external to their business and ultimately as a hindrance, to be complied with
only formally or even “gamed.”100 Compliance officers will likely succeed
in catching most of the egregious violations through this kind of
monitoring, but there are likely to be others that slip by them.101 More
significantly, there may be problems that do not rise yet to the level of
violations but that could do so in time or that pose professional or ethical
issues, which may have an eventual, calamitous effect upon the firm if
brokers continue to engage in them.
While compliance officers must continue to produce the WSPs (if only
to let brokers know about their legal obligations) and to monitor for
compliance, their ultimate goal has to be self- or internal compliance by a
broker—the compliance officer would be left essentially to be an advisor on
difficult issues.102 In other words, the ideal purpose of a compliance officer
would be to have brokers internalize legal and regulatory policies and
ethical standards so that these policies and standards come to the
foreground in their decision-making and displace others, such as selfinterest, which could lead to legal and ethical violations.103 This purpose
falls squarely within the educational and cultural role of compliance. Yet in
order to promote this internal compliance, compliance officers would have
to understand how decision-making in fact occurs in people, particularly
when they have competing goals and work in cohesive groups and
organizations, and what techniques might be used to encourage brokers to
focus on legal and ethical standards in decision-making. This understanding

100. See Tammy L. MacLean & Michael Behnam, The Dangers of Decoupling: The
Relationship Between Compliance Programs, Legitimacy Perceptions, and Institutionalized
Misconduct, 53 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1499 (2010) (discussing how compliance programs can become
divorced from the business activity of the firm, resulting in more misconduct). In other words, the
employees would find a way to “disengage” the legal and ethical values from their everyday
practice. See generally Albert Bandura et al., Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement in the
Exercise of Moral Agency, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 364 (1996) (discussing the
classic processes of moral disengagement: justifying detrimental action by (i) classifying it as
moral, (ii) diffusing the responsibility for it, (iii) disregarding or distorting its consequences, and
(iv) blaming the victims for one’s actions).
101. What I term “external” monitoring is always necessary for compliance, since it is a major
way in which social values are enforced. See Bandura et al., supra note 100, at 372. Thus, I am not
suggesting that we eliminate the detailed compliance procedures and the external monitoring.
102. I explore this notion in more depth in a paper entitled Surveillant and Counselor: A
Reorientation in Compliance for Financial Firms, (Brooklyn Law Sch. Legal Studies Working
Paper Series, Paper No. 358, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2321317.
103. Another way of saying this is to ensure that the policies and standards do not “fade.” See
generally MAX H. BAZERMAN & ANN E. TENBRUNSEL, BLIND SPOTS: WHY WE FAIL TO DO
WHAT’S RIGHT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 69 (2011) (discussing “ethical” fading, where ethical
dimensions of a decision “fade” at the time of decision-making).
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is likely to come from the disciplines of psychology, social psychology,
organizational studies, and, to a lesser extent, from economics.104
For a long time, management scholars have provided these kinds of
insights and guidance to managers and executives, who of course are
concerned with having legally and ethically compliant organizations and
employees.105 It seems to me that legal scholars who follow developments,
or who are even trained, in the above fields could do the same for
compliance officers, particularly, as noted above, since an increasing
number of compliance officers have legal training and are open to
discussions with law professors. This work should be attractive to securities
law scholars, for they are concerned with legal policies that improve the
functioning of markets and market intermediaries. Certainly, investors will
actively participate in securities markets if they perceive, partly as a result
of a more robust compliance, that the broker is acting on their behalf in
accordance with securities law policies and SRO professional standards,
and not just thinking of investors as a personal profit center.
CONCLUSION
The symposium at Brooklyn Law School, as well as the contributions in
this issue, recognizes the growth and importance of compliance in financial
firms. Its growth was initially spurred by the statutory and regulatory
requirements of broker-dealers to have supervisory systems to address the
potential supervisory liability of the firm and its managers for legal and
ethical violations by its employees. As the legal, regulatory, and ethical
obligations on firms and their employees have grown over the past forty
years, compliance has evolved from a minor task performed by a supervisor
with the assistance of outside counsel, or by back office personnel, to a
developed control function in the firm. Now compliance officers, who are
required in every firm, often preside over a large department and have a seat

104. I give this qualification to economics because its model of human decision-making appears
not to reflect how people actually make decisions in real circumstances. For a summary of
advances of economics in this regards, see Nicholas C. Barberis, Thirty Years of Prospect Theory
in Economics: A Review and Assessment, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 173 (2013). On the utility of the
economic rational actor framework in some circumstances, see Colin F. Camerer & Ernst Fehr,
When Does “Economic Man” Dominate Social Behavior?, 311 SCIENCE 47 (2006).
105. Many of the scholarly articles providing this guidance appear in, among other places, the
Academy of Management publications. I have mentioned several of these works in the course of
the last paragraphs. For other useful works, see Brian C. Gunia et al., Contemplation and
Conversation: Subtle Influences on Moral Decision Making, 55 ACAD. MGMT. J. 13, 17, 22
(2012) (finding that conversation that raises ethical matters or figures, as opposed to conversation
focusing on self-interest, leads to more ethical decisions); David M. Mayer et al., Who Displays
Ethical Leadership, and Why Does It Matter? An Examination of Antecedents and Consequences
of Ethical Leadership, 55 ACAD. MGMT. J. 151, 153–54 (2012) (discussing the importance of
ethical leadership in organizations); Long Wang & J. Keith Murnighan, On Greed, 5 ACAD.
MGMT. ANNALS 279, 301 (2011) (discussing how “calculative” self-interested mindset is
triggered).
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at the table of top management. With the growth of compliance has come
its development as a career path, which is attractive in a tight job market.
For this and for other reasons, compliance is now noticed by law schools.
I have argued in this introductory Article that the new attention to
compliance could be fruitful both to legal scholars and to compliance
officers. The latter occupy a key place on the front lines of financial firms
between regulators and employees conducting the securities business. They
are expected to help firm employees comply with legal and ethical
obligations in jobs that demand considerable freedom and discretion. If
compliance officers are to be successful in this goal, they need to do more
than simply translate the laws and rules for employees and monitor
compliance with them. They have to promote compliant conduct within the
employees themselves, which is a complex advisory and educational task.
The interaction between compliance officers and legal scholars, who follow
developments in disciplines like social psychology and organizational
research that study how to promote compliant and ethical conduct, could
contribute to the future growth and success of compliance itself. Let us
hope that our symposium will be one of many steps in this fruitful
collaboration.

